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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Table 3
Summary of notations.
Notation Description
AP Access Point
LP Location Proof
DP/EP Distance/Elevation Proof
R Communication range of APs
∆T Duration of silence periods
EOPE(·) Order-preserving encryption scheme
GKpub The public group key. It is known by everyone.
GKpriv The private group key. It is known only by (all) the APs.
GKOPE The group key used for order-preserving encryption. It is
known only by (all) the APs.
LPi,j The j-th LP collected at sampling time ti. It has format
{Pi, ti,j , (xi,j , yi,j)}.
Pi The pseudonym which is used at sampling time ti.
ti,j The time at which the j-th LP is collected at sampling
time ti.
(xi,j , yi,j) The coordinate of the AP from which the j-th LP is
collected at sampling time ti.
Ci The set of APs from which the LPs are collected at
sampling time ti.
Ai The time-aligned intersection of the communication discs
of the APs from which the LPs are collected at sampling
time ti.
APPENDIX B
FORMALIZATION OF THE SAMPLING PROBLEM
In this appendix, we detail the graph construction for the
maximum-weight path formulation of the sampling prob-
lem in different scenarios (with one or multiple operators,
with or without silence periods). Unlike in the base case,
with silence periods, we must distinguish between the sam-
ples where a user collects a location proof to start a distance
proof and those where she collects a location proof to end
a distance proof. The case of a single operator with silence
periods is illustrated in Figure 11. We build a graph with two
vertices per time sample that correspond to both situations
(“start” and “end”). The “start” vertex corresponding to τi
is connected to all the “end” vertices corresponding to τj
(j > i), which means that a distance proof started at time
τi can be ended at any time τj (j > i). The weight of such
edges (depicted with solid lines in the figure) is the value
of the distance proof obtained, i.e., d(Ai, Aj). To start a
new distance proof, the users must observe a silence period.
Implementing silence periods means that a user cannot start
a new distance proof before ∆T time units after she ended
her last distance proof. In other words, assuming that the
time between two time samples is 10 seconds and that
∆T = 15, if a user ends a distance proof at τi, she can
start a new distance proof at τi+2 at the earliest. Therefore,
we connect the “end” vertex corresponding to τi to all the
“end” vertices corresponding to τj (j > i + 1). The weight
of such edges (depicted with dashed lines) is zero.
In the case of multiple operators, we build a graph with
two vertices per sample (“start”/”end”), for each operator.
A distance proof started with a location proof of a given
operator can be ended only with a location proof from the
same operator, therefore the “start” vertices are connected
only to the “end” vertices of the same operator. The “end”
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Figure 11. Graph construction for the maximum-weight path formulation
of the sampling problem (one operator, with silence periods). Solid
edges have weights equal to the corresponding distance proofs (di,j
is the short for d(Ai, Aj)). Dashed edges have zero weights. The thick,
red path shows an example of a set of sampling points: The user starts a
distance proof at time τ1 (by collecting location proofs), which she ends
at time τ2 thus collecting a proof of value d1,2; she then starts a new
distance proof at time τ4 (thus observing a silence period) which she
ends at time τ5. The total weight of this path is d1,2 + d4,5.
vertices, however, are connected to the start vertices of all
the operators as a user can start a new distance proof with
any of the operators. The construction of these edges follows
the same rationale as above, except that a user does not
need a silence period when starting a distance proof with an
operator different than that of the previous distance proof.
APPENDIX C
DATA-SET DETAILS
In this appendix, we give more statistics about the data-
sets we used in the evaluation of SecureRun. Figure 12 and
Figure 14 (top) depict, in the form of heatmaps, the densities
of FON access points in Brussels, London and Paris and the
densities of Free access points in Paris. Figure 14 (bottom)
depicts the densities of Garmin activities.
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Figure 12. Heat-map of the density of Free access points in Paris.
Figure 13 shows the elevation map of Paris, where we eval-
uated the performance of SecureRun for elevation proofs.
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Figure 13. Heat-map of the elevation in Paris.
Figure 15 show the distributions (experimental CDFs) of
the duration, length, elevation gain, density of APs along the
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Figure 14. Heat-maps of the densities of FON access points (top) and of Garmin activities (bottom) in (a) Brussels, (b) London, and (c) Paris.
activity and the proportion of covered chunks (as defined
in the data-set section) among the activities of the Garmin
data-set (after filtering using the parameters from Table 1).
Table 4
Summary of the statistics of the filtered data-sets (FON and Garmin
Connect) used in the evaluation (mean and standard deviation).
Brussels London Paris
Number of AP 92,280 39,776 87,521
Number of activities 107 294 437
Density of AP (AP/km2) 401±569 109±96.6 646±686
Density of AP along path (AP/km) 17.1±12.0 5.99±1.67 23.8±18.6
Proportion of covered chunks (%) 63.9±20.0 83.0±15.0 77.7±23.5
Table 4 gives some statistics on our (filtered) data sets of
access points and activities (i.e., FON and Garmin Connect).
It can be observed that the density of access points is lower
in London but they are more uniformly spread, especially
along activities (as illustrated by the relatively small stan-
dard deviation compared to Brussels and Paris).
APPENDIX D
INVESTIGATION OF THE CORNER CASES
In this appendix, we report on our manual inspection of
the paths of the activities for which SecureRun provides
low-accuracy summaries despite the high density of access
points along the path and the high proportion of covered
chunks. During our investigation, we found one typical case
of such situations, which we show in Figure 16 and explain
below. The general pattern is when a fraction of the path
is very densely covered by access points but the rest is
not; hence the average density over the whole path remains
relatively high. More specifically, the user typically runs in
a periodic fashion (e.g., around a stadium or back and forth
on a street) on the part that is not well covered by access
points, but this part is still covered by one or several APs
(very close to each other) in a single location; hence the user
cannot obtain any distance proofs (all the location proofs
come from the same set of access points located close to each
other) and almost all the chunks of the path are covered.
1
Figure 16. Example of an activity for which proportion of covered chunks
is greater than 80% and the precision is smaller than 25% (planned
sampling, ∆T = 60 s). The path is shown as a dashed line and the
circles denote the communication ranges of the APs. The shaded areas
represent the combined location proofs obtained at the sampling points.
It can be observed in the sample case that the user first
runs to a stadium through a residential area and then runs
a dozen of times inside the stadium on the 400-meter track.
Because the stadium is covered by a single AP, all the chunks
of the activity are covered, but it is not sufficient to increase
the accuracy as all LPs are obtained from the same AP.
APPENDIX E
DP CALCULATION WITH NEGATIVE INFORMATION
In Equation 1, we consider only the set Ci and do not take
into account the fact that the user was not in the regions de-
fined by the access points in the set C\Ci (hereafter, we call
this negative information). Intuitively, if negative information
is considered, the region that the user is inside at time ti
could be redefined as the intersection of Ai (as defined in
Equation 1) and the complements of the regions defined by
the APs in C\Ci. Therefore, the negative information would
provide a tighter estimate of the area the user was in at time
ti. This would provide better accuracy for the system, as the
refined region is included in Ai, but it would also enable
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Figure 15. Experimental CDF of the (a) duration, (b) length, (c) elevation gain (d) density of FON AP (along the activity) and (e) proportion of chunks
covered by FON APs, among the activities from the Garmin data-set.
the user to cheat by selectively reporting only a subset of
the collected LPs (i.e., omitting some of the collected LPs
to unduly increase the resulting distance proofs). For this
reason, in our evaluation of SecureRun, we do not consider
the negative information when calculating the lower-bound
distance.
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Figure 17. The lower-bound distance w/ and w/o considering negative
information. The figures on the left show the case that using negative
information improves the tightness of the lower-bound distance. The
figures on the right show that using negative information can enable
the users to unduly increase their lower-bound distance. The location
samples of the user are shown with a dot.
These situations are illustrated in Figure 17: It can be
observed on the left-most figures that, when the user is
not in the intersection of the communication ranges of two
or more APs, considering negative information (bottom)
increases the accuracy of the distance proof compared to
the base case (top). It can also be observed on the right-most
figures that, when the user is in the intersection, by omitting
to report one of the LP she collects (bottom), she can unduly
obtain a larger distance proof (potentially higher than the
actual distance) compared to the base case (top).
APPENDIX F
SURVEY DETAILS
In this appendix, we give more details about our online
survey. First, we give the complete transcript of our survey
questionnaire (Figures 19 and 20). Long lists of options have
been truncated for the sake of conciseness. Our online ques-
tionnaire was designed with the LimeSurvey system and
interfaced with the HealthGraph API in order to access the
participants’ RunKeeper account data. We used this data for
screening purposes. Second, we give more detailed statistics
about the survey participant’s responses. In Figure 18, we
show the repartition of the participants’ concerns regarding
the authenticity and the privacy implications of the activity
data shared with activity-tracking applications.
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(b) privacy concerns
Figure 18. Survey participants’ concerns regarding (a) the authenticity of
the activity data shared by their friends and (b) the privacy implications
of the activity data they share.
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Demographics
1) What is your gender?
© Male
© Female
2) How old are you?
3) What is your primary area of employment?
© Retired
© Unemployed
© Student
© Arts, entertainment, or recreation
© Agriculture, forestry, fishery, or hunting
© [. . . ]
© Transportation
© Other:
4) Besides RunKeeper, which of the following fitness applications are you a member of?
 Strava
 Runtastic
 GarminConnect
 Moves
 Endomondo
 MapMyFitness
 Other:
Fitness data sharing on online social networks
5) How often do you share your fitness activities with your friends?
© Always
© It depends
© Never
6) When do you share your location-based fitness activities with your friends?
[shown only if the answer to the previous question is “It depends”]
 When I take a new path
 When I break a record
 When I want to compete with myself or with my friends
 Other:
7) Applications such as digitalEPO.com and Fake Track enable users to claim a performance that they did not actually achieve.
Were you aware of this fact?
© Yes
© No
8) Knowing this fact, how important to you is the authenticity of the fitness activities your friends share?
© Extremely
© Very
© Moderately
© Slightly
© Not at all
9) Sensitive information can be inferred from the data you upload on RunKeeper (e.g., home/work locations, medical conditions).
Moreover, it has been shown that some popular fitness applications pass personal details about their users to insurance companies,
e.g., to set premiums (Click here for more details*)
Were you aware of this fact?
© Yes
© No
10) Knowing this fact, how important to you are the privacy implications of the data you upload on RunKeeper?
© Extremely
© Very
© Moderately
© Slightly
© Not at all
*http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2409486/
Figure 19. Transcript of our survey questionnaire (1/2).
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Secure and private activity summaries
11) We designed a system, named SecureRun, that provides you with two main features:
• It protects your privacy. Specifically, the GPS traces of your activities is known only to you. You share only the summaries of
your performance (e.g., the covered distance), and the coarse-grained information about the region where you perform your
activities.
• It guarantees the authenticity of a fraction of the performance you report. For example, if you run 10 miles and report it,
SecureRun can certify (based on cryptographic techniques) that you indeed ran at least 8 miles out of the 10 miles you ran.
We illustrate the differences between RunKeeper and SecureRun in the images below.
Assuming that you have run 10 miles, please choose your levels of satisfaction for the different values for which you would
receive certification from SecureRun.
Very low Low Medium High Very high
5 miles © © © © ©
6 miles © © © © ©
7 miles © © © © ©
8 miles © © © © ©
9 miles © © © © ©
Figure 20. Transcript of our survey questionnaire (2/2).
